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Abstract. This paper presents the Neural Network Verification (NNV)
software tool, a set-based verification framework for deep neural net-
works (DNNs) and learning-enabled cyber-physical systems (CPS). The
crux of NNV is a collection of reachability algorithms that make use of
a variety of set representations, such as polyhedra, star sets, zonotopes,
and abstract-domain representations. NNV supports both exact (sound
and complete) and over-approximate (sound) reachability algorithms for
verifying safety and robustness properties of feed-forward neural net-
works (FFNNs) with various activation functions. For learning-enabled
CPS, such as closed-loop control systems incorporating neural networks,
NNV provides exact and over-approximate reachability analysis schemes
for linear plant models and FFNN controllers with piecewise-linear ac-
tivation functions, such as ReLUs. For similar neural network control
systems (NNCS) that instead have nonlinear plant models, NNV sup-
ports over-approximate analysis by combining the star set analysis used
for FFNN controllers with zonotope-based analysis for nonlinear plant
dynamics building on CORA. We evaluate NNV using two real-world
case studies: the first is safety verification of ACAS Xu networks, and
the second deals with the safety verification of a deep learning-based
adaptive cruise control system.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have quickly become one of the most widely used
tools for dealing with complex and challenging problems in numerous domains,
such as image classification [10, 16, 25], function approximation, and natural
language translation [11, 18]. Recently, DNNs have been used in safety-critical
cyber-physical systems (CPS), such as autonomous vehicles [8, 9, 47] and air
traffic collision avoidance systems [21]. Although utilizing DNNs in safety-critical
applications can demonstrate considerable performance benefits, assuring the
safety and robustness of these systems is challenging because DNNs possess
complex non-linear characteristics. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that
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Fig. 1: An overview of NNV and its major modules and components.
their behavior can be unpredictable due to slight perturbations in their inputs
(i.e., adversarial perturbations) [35].
In this paper, we introduce the NNV (Neural Network Verification) tool,
which is a software framework that performs set-based verification for DNNs
and learning-enabled CPS, known colloquially as neural network control systems
(NNCS) as shown in Figure 23. NNV provides a set of reachability algorithms
that can compute both the exact and over-approximate reachable sets of DNNs
and NNCSs using a variety of set representations such as polyhedra [38,48–51],
star sets [28,36,37,39], zonotopes [31], and abstract domain representations [32].
The reachable set obtained from NNV contains all possible states of a DNN from
bounded input sets or of a NNCS from sets of initial states of a plant model.
NNV declares a DNN or a NNCS to be safe if, and only if, their reachable sets do
not violate safety properties (i.e., have a non-empty intersection with any state
satisfying the negation of the safety property). If a safety property is violated,
NNV can construct a complete set of counter-examples demonstrating the set
of all possible unsafe initial inputs and states by using the star-based exact
reachability algorithm [36, 39]. To speed up computation, NNV uses parallel
computing, as the majority of the reachability algorithms in NNV are more
efficient when executed on multi-core platforms and clusters.
NNV has been successfully applied to safety verification and robustness anal-
ysis of several real-world DNNs, primarily feedforward neural networks (FFNNs)
and convolutional neural networks (CNNs), as well as learning-enabled CPS. To
highlight NNV’s capabilities, we present brief experimental results from two
case studies. The first compares methods for safety verification of the ACAS
Xu networks [21], and the second presents safety verification of a learning-based
adaptive cruise control (ACC) system.
3 The source code for NNV is publicly available: https://github.com/verivital/
nnv/. A CodeOcean capsule is also available: https://doi.org/10.24433/CO.
1314285.v1, which will be updated with a new DOI and the latest reproducibil-
ity results if accepted. The latest version of the CodeOcean capsule with all aspects
described in this paper is available at: https://codeocean.com/capsule/1314285/,
which requires a username (taylor.johnson@uta.edu) and password (cav2020ae) to
access. This account has read-only permission, so to rerun the results shown in
the capsule, you can select Capsule then Duplicate from the menu bar, which will
clone the capsule to allow rerunning and editing if desired. Detailed instructions for
the artifact evaluation are available at: https://github.com/verivital/run_nnv_
comparison/blob/cav2020/README_AE.md
Fig. 2: Architecture of a typical neural network control system (NNCS).
2 Overview and Features
NNV is an object-oriented toolbox written in Matlab, which was chosen in part
due to the prevalence of Matlab/Simulink in the design of CPS. It uses the MPT
toolbox [26] for polytope-based reachability analysis and visualization [38], and
makes use of CORA [3] for zonotope-based reachability analysis of nonlinear
plant models [36]. NNV also utilizes the Neural Network Model Transformation
Tool (NNMT) for transforming neural network models from Keras and Tensor-
flow into Matlab using the Open Neural Network Exchange (ONNX) format,
and the Hybrid Systems Model Transformation and Translation tool (HyST) [5]
for plant configuration.
The NNV toolbox contains two main modules: a computation engine and
an analyzer, shown in Figure 1. The computation engine module consists of
four subcomponents: 1) the FFNN constructor, 2) the NNCS constructor, 3) the
reachability solvers, and 4) the evaluator. The FFNN constructor takes a net-
work configuration file as an input and generates a FFNN object. The NNCS
constructor takes the FFNN object and the plant configuration, which describes
the dynamics of a system, as inputs and then creates an NNCS object. Depend-
ing on the application, either the FFNN (or NNCS) object will be fed into a
reachability solver to compute the reachable set of the FFNN (or NNCS) from
a given initial set of states. Then, the obtained reachable set will be passed to
the analyzer module. The analyzer module consists of three subcomponents: 1)
a visualizer, 2) a safety checker, and 3) a falsifier. The visualizer can be called to
plot the obtained reachable set. Given a safety specification, the safety checker
can reason about the safety of the FFNN or NNCS with respect to the specifica-
tion. When an exact (sound and complete) reachability solver is used, such as the
star-based solver, the safety checker can return either ”safe,” or ”unsafe” along
with a set of counterexamples. When an over-approximate (sound) reachability
solver is used, such as the zonotope-based scheme or the approximate star-based
solvers, the safety checker can return either ”safe” or ”uncertain” (unknown).
In this case, the falsifier automatically calls the evaluator to generate simula-
tion traces to find a counterexample. If the falsifier can find a counterexample,
then NNV returns unsafe. Otherwise, it returns unknown. A summary of NNV’s
major features is given in Table 1.
3 Set Representations and Reachability Algorithms
NNV implements a set of reachability algorithms for sequential FFNNs and
CNNs, as well as NNCS with FFNN controllers as shown in Figure 2. The reach-
able set of a sequential FFNN is computed layer-by-layer. The output reachable
set of a layer is the input set of the next layer in the network.
Feature Exact Analysis Over-approximate Analysis
Components FFNN, CNN, NNCS FFNN, CNN, NNCS
Plant dynamics (for NNCS) Linear ODE Linear ODE, Nonlinear ODE
Discrete/Continuous (for NNCS) Discrete Time Discrete Time, Continuous Time
Activation functions ReLU, Satlin ReLU, Satlin, Sigmoid, Tanh
CNN Layers MaxPool, Conv, BN, AvgPool, FC MaxPool, Conv, BN, AvgPool, FC
Reachability methods Star, Polyhedron, ImageStar Star, Zonotope, Abstract-domain, ImageStar
Reachable set/Flow-pipe Visualization Yes Yes
Parallel computing Yes Partially supported
Safety verification Yes Yes
Falsification Yes Yes
Robustness verification (for FFNN/CNN) Yes Yes
Counterexample generation Yes Yes
Table 1: Overview of major features available in NNV. Links refer to relevant
files/classes in the NNV codebase. BN refers to batch normalization layers, FC to
fully-connected layers, AvgPool to average pooling layers, Conv to convolutional
layers, and MaxPool to max pooling layers.
3.1 Polyhedron [38]
The polyhedron reachability algorithm computes the exact polyhedron reach-
able set of a FFNN with ReLU activation functions. The exact reachability
computation of layer L in a FFNN is done as follows. First, we construct the
affine mapping I¯ of the input polyhedron set I, using the weight matrix W and
the bias vector b, i.e., I¯ = W × I + b. Then, the exact reachable set of the
layer RL is constructed by executing a sequence of stepReLU operations, i.e.,
RL = stepReLUn(stepReLUn−1(· · · (stepReLU1(I¯)))). Since a stepReLU oper-
ation can split a polyhedron into two new polyhedra, the exact reachable set of
a layer in a FFNN is usually a union of polyhedra. The polyhedron reachabil-
ity algorithm is computationally expensive because computing affine mappings
with polyhedra is costly. Additionally, when computing the reachable set, the
polyhedron approach extensively uses the expensive conversion between the H-
representation and the V-representation. These are the main drawbacks that
limit the scalability of the polyhedron approach. Despite that, we extend the
polyhedron reachability algorithm for NNCSs with FFNN controllers. However,
the propagation of polyhedra in NNCS may lead to a large degree of conserva-
tiveness in the computed reachable set [36].
3.2 Star Set [36,39] (code)
The star set is an efficient set representation for simulation-based verification of
large linear systems [6,7,40] where the superposition property of a linear system
can be exploited in the analysis. It has been shown in [39] that the star set is
also suitable for reachability analysis of FFNNs. In contrast to polyhedra, the
affine mapping and intersection with a half space of a star set is more easily com-
puted. NNV implements an enhanced version of the exact and over-approximate
reachability algorithms for FFNNs proposed in [39] by minimizing the number
of LP optimization problems that need to be solved in the computation. The
exact algorithm that makes use of star sets is similar to the polyhedron method
that makes use of stepReLU operations. However, it is much faster and more
scalable than the polyhedron method because of the advantage that star sets
have in affine mapping and intersection. The approximate algorithm obtains an
over-approximation of the exact reachable set by approximating the exact reach-
able set after applying an activation function, e.g., ReLU, Tanh, Sigmoid. We
refer readers to [39] for a detailed discussion of star-set reachability algorithms
for FFNNs.
We note that NNV implements enhanced versions of earlier star-based reach-
ability algorithms [39]. Particularly, we minimize the number of linear program-
ming (LP) optimization problems that must be solved in order to construct the
reachable set of a FFNN by quickly estimating the ranges of all of the states in
the star set using only the ranges of the predicate variables. Additionally, the
extensions of the star reachability algorithms to NNCS with linear plant models
can eliminate the explosion of conservativeness in the polyhedron method [36,37].
The reason behind this is that in star sets, the relationship between the plant
state variables and the control inputs is preserved in the computation since they
are defined by a unique set of predicate variables. We refer readers to [36,37] for
a detailed discussion of the extensions of the star-based reachability algorithms
for NNCSs with linear/nonlinear plant models.
3.3 Zonotope [31] (code)
NNV implements the zonotope reachability algorithms proposed in [31] for FFNNs.
Similar to the over-approximate algorithm using star sets, the zonotope algo-
rithm computes an over-approximation of the exact reachable set of a FFNN.
Although the zonotope reachability algorithm is very fast and scalable, it pro-
duces a very conservative reachable set in comparison to the star set method
as shown in [39]. Consequently, zonotope-based reachability algorithms are usu-
ally only more efficient for very small input sets. As an example it can be more
suitable for robustness certification.
3.4 Abstract Domain [32]
NNV implements the abstract domain reachability algorithm proposed in [32]
for FFNNs. NNV’s abstract domain reachability algorithm specifies an abstract
domain as a star set and uses a “back-tracking” approach to estimate the over-
approximate ranges of the states. The abstract domain is more conservative than
the star set method.
3.5 ImageStar Set (code)
NNV recently introduced a new set representation called the ImageStar for use
in the verification of deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs). Briefly, the Im-
ageStar is a generalization of the star set where the anchor and generator vectors
are replaced by multi-channel images. The ImageStar is efficient in the analy-
sis of convolutional layers, average pooling layers, and fully connected layers,
whereas max pooling layers and ReLU layers consume most of computation time
in reachability analysis of CNNs. NNV implements exact and over-approximate
reachability algorithms using the ImageStar for serial CNNs. Since the ImageStar
method has not been published yet, we defer its evaluation in our experimental
evaluation. In short, using the ImageStar, we can analyze the robustness un-
der adversarial attacks of the real-world VGG16 and VGG19 deep perception
networks [30] that consist of > 100 million parameters.
4 Evaluation
The experiments presented in this section were performed on a desktop with the
following configuration: Intel Core i7-6700 CPU @ 3.4GHz 8 core Processor, 64
GB Memory, and 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS OS.
4.1 Safety verification of ACAS Xu networks
We evaluate NNV in comparison to Reluplex [22], Marabou [23], and ReluVal
[44], by considering the verification of safety property φ3, and φ4 of the ACAS
Xu neural networks [21] for all 45 networks.4 All the experiments were done
using 4 cores for the computation. The verification results are summarized in
Table 2 where (SAT) denotes that the networks are safe, (UNSAT) denotes
unsafe, and (UNK) denotes unknown. We note that (UNK) may occur due to
the conservativeness of the reachability analysis scheme. Detailed verification
results are presented in the appendix. For a fast comparison with other tools, we
also tested a subset input of Property 1-4 on all the 45 networks. The results are
also shown in the appendix. We note that the polyhedron method [38] achieves
a timeout on most of networks, and therefore, we neglect this method in the
comparison.
Verification time. For property φ3, our exact-star method is about 20.7×
faster than Reluplex, 14.2× faster than Marabou, 81.6× faster than Marabou-
DnC (i.e., divide and conquer method). The approximate star method is 547×
faster than Reluplex, 374× faster than Marabou, 2151× faster than Marabou-
DnC, and 8× faster than ReluVal. For property φ4, our exact-star method
is 25.3× faster than Reluplex, 18.0× faster than Marabou, 53.4× faster than
Marabou-DnC, while the approximate star method is 625× faster than Relu-
plex, 445× faster than Marabou, 1321× faster than Marabou-DnC.
Conservativeness. The approximate star method is much less conservative
than the zonotope and abstract domain methods. This is illustrated since it can
verify more networks than the zonotope and abstract domain methods, and is
because it obtains a tighter over-approximate reachable set. For property φ3, the
zonotope and abstract domain methods can prove the safety of 2/45 networks,
(4.44%) and 19/45 networks, (42.22%) respectively, while our approximate star
4 We omitted properties φ1 and φ2 for space and due to their long runtimes, but they
can be reproduced in the artifact evaluation if desired.
ACAS XU φ3 SAT UNSAT UNK
TIMEOUT
TIME(s)
1h 2h 10h
Reluplex 3 42 0 2 0 0 28454
Marabou 3 42 0 1 0 0 19466
Marabou DnC 3 42 0 3 3 1 111880
ReluVal 3 42 0 0 0 0 416
Zonotope 0 2 43 0 0 0 3
Abstract Domain 0 10 35 0 0 0 72
NNV Exact Star 3 42 0 0 0 0 1371
NNV Appr. Star 0 29 16 0 0 0 52
ACAS XU φ4
Reluplex 3 42 0 0 0 0 11880
Marabou 3 42 0 0 0 0 8470
Marabou DnC 3 42 0 2 2 0 25110
ReluVal 3 42 0 0 0 0 27
Zonotope 0 1 44 0 0 0 5
Abstract Domain 0 0 45 0 0 0 7
NNV Exact Star 3 42 0 0 0 0 470
NNV Appr. Star 0 32 13 0 0 0 19
Table 2: Verification results of ACAS Xu networks.
method can prove the safety of 29/45 networks, (64.4% ). For property φ4, the
zonotope and abstract domain method can prove the safety of 1/45 networks,
(2.22%) and 0/45 networks, (0.00%) respectively while the approximate star
method can prove the safety of 32/45, (71.11%).
4.2 Safety Verification of Adaptive Cruise Control System
To illustrate how NNV can be used to verify/falsify safety properties of learning-
enabled CPS, we analyze a learning-based ACC system depicted in Figure 3, in
which the ego vehicle has a radar sensor to measure the distance to the lead
vehicle in the same lane, Drel, as well as the relative velocity of the lead vehicle,
Vrel. The ego vehicle has two control modes. In speed control mode, it travels at
a driver-specified set speed Vset = 30, and in spacing control mode, it maintains
a safe distance from the lead vehicle, Dsafe. We train a neural network with 5
layers, 20 neurons per layer utilizing the ReLU activation function to control the
ego vehicle with a control period of 0.1 seconds.
We investigate safety of the learning-based ACC system with two types of
plant dynamics: 1) a discrete linear plant, and 2) a nonlinear continuous plant
governed by the following differential equations:
x˙lead(t) = vlead(t), v˙lead(t) = γlead, γ˙lead(t) = −2γlead(t) + 2alead − µv2lead(t),
x˙ego(t) = vego(t), v˙ego(t) = γego, γ˙ego(t) = −2γego(t) + 2aego − µv2ego(t),
where xlead(xego), vlead(vego) and γlead(γego) are the position, velocity and ac-
celeration of the lead (ego) vehicle respectively. alead(aego) is the acceleration
control input applied to the lead (ego) vehicle, and µ = 0.0001 is a friction
parameter. To obtain a discrete linear model of the plant, we let µ = 0 and
Fig. 3: Learning-based Adaptive Cruise Control System [1].
discretize the corresponding linear continuous model using a zero-order hold on
the inputs with a sample time of 0.1 seconds (i.e., the control period).
Verification Problem. The scenario we are interested in is when the two
vehicles are operating at a safe distance between them and the ego vehicle is in
speed control mode. In this state the lead vehicle driver suddenly decelerates with
alead = −5 to reduce the speed. We want to verify if the neural network controller
on the ego vehicle will also de-accelerate to maintain a safe distance between
the two vehicles. To guarantee safety, we require that Drel = xlead − xego ≥
Dsafe = Ddefault+Tgap×vego where Tgap = 1.4 seconds and Ddefault = 10. Our
analysis investigates if the safety requirement holds in the 5 seconds after the
lead vehicle decelerates. We consider the safety of the system under the following
initial conditions: xlead(0) ∈ [90, 92], vlead(0) ∈ [20, 30], γlead(0) = γego(0) = 0,
vego(0) ∈ [30, 30.5], xego ∈ [30, 31].
Verification results. For linear dynamics, NNV can compute both the exact
and over-approximate reachable sets of the ACC system in bounded time steps,
while for nonlinear dynamics, NNV constructs an over-approximation of the
exact reachable sets and uses it for safety verification. The verification results
for linear and nonlinear models using the over-approximate star method are
presented in Table 3, which shows that, the safety of the ACC system depends
on the initial velocity of the lead vehicle. When the initial velocity of the lead
vehicle is smaller than 27(m/s), the ACC system with the discrete plant model
is unsafe. Using the exact star method, NNV can construct a complete set of
counter-example inputs. When the over-approximate star method is used, if there
is a potential safety violation, NNV simulates the system with 1000 random
inputs from the input set to find counter examples. If a counterexample is found,
the system is UNSAFE, otherwise, NNV returns a safety result of UNKNOWN.
Figure 4 visualizes the reachable sets of the relative distance Drel between two
vehicles versus the required safe distance Dsafe over time for two cases of initial
velocities of the lead vehicle: vlead(0) ∈ [29, 30] and vlead(0) ∈ [24, 25]. We can
see that in the first case, Dref ≥ Dsafe for all 50 time steps stating that the
system is safe. In the second case, Dref < Dsafe in some control steps which
means that the system is unsafe. NNV supports a reachLive method to perform
analysis and reachable set visualization on-the-fly to help the user observe the
behavior of the system during verification.
The verification results for ACC system with the nonlinear model are all
UNSAFE, which is surprising. Since the neural network controller of the ACC
system was trained with the linear model, it works quite well for the linear model.
However, when a small friction term is added to the linear model to form a
v lead(0)
Linear Plant Nonlinear Plant
Safety V T (s) Safety V T (s)
[29, 30] SAFE 9.60 UNSAFE 346.62
[28, 29] SAFE 9.45 UNSAFE 277.50
[27, 28] SAFE 9.82 UNSAFE 289.70
[26, 27] UNSAFE 17.80 UNSAFE 315.60
[25, 26] UNSAFE 19.24 UNSAFE 305.56
[24, 25] UNSAFE 18.12 UNSAFE 372.00
Table 3: Verification results for ACC system with different plant models, where
V T is the verification time (in seconds).
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Fig. 4: Two scenarios of the ACC system. In the first (top) scenario (vlead(0) ∈
[29, 30]m/s), safety is guaranteed, Drel ≥ Dsafe. In the second scenario (bot-
tom) (vlead(0) ∈ [24, 25]m/s), safety is violated since Dref < Dsafe in some
control steps.
nonlinear model, the neural network controller’s performance, in terms of safety,
is significantly reduced. This problem raises an important issue in training neural
network controllers using simulation data, and these schemes may not work in
real systems since there is always a mismatch between the plant model in the
simulation engine and the real system.
Verification times. As shown in Table 3, the approximate analysis of the
ACC system with discrete linear plant model is very fast. It can be done in 84
seconds. We note that NNV also supports exact analysis, which is computation-
ally expensive since it constructs all reachable sets of the system. Because there
are splits in the reachable sets of the neural network controller, the number of
star sets in the reachable set of the plant increases quickly over time [36]. In
contrast, the over-approximate method computes the interval hull of all reach-
able star sets at each time step. It maintains a single reachable set of the plant
throughout the computation. Therefore, the over-approximate method is much
faster than the exact method. In terms of plant models, the nonlinear model
requires more computation time than the linear one. As shown in Table 3, the
verification for linear model using the over-approximate method is 22.7× faster
on average than the verification of the nonlinear model.
5 Related Work
NNV was inspired by many insightful research works in the emerging fields
of neural network and machine learning verification. For the “open-loop” ver-
ification problem (verification of DNNs), many efficient techniques have been
proposed, such as SMT-based methods [22, 23, 29], mixed-integer linear pro-
gramming methods [14, 24, 27], set-based methods [4, 17, 31, 32, 43, 45, 49], and
optimization methods [46,52]. For the “closed-loop” verification problem (NCCS
verification), we note that the Verisig approach [20] is very efficient for NNCS
with nonlinear plants and with Sigmoid and Tanh activation functions. Addition-
ally, the recent regressive polynomial rule inference approach [33] is very fast for
the safety verification of NNCS with nonlinear plant models and ReLU activa-
tion functions. The satisfiability modulo convex (SMC) approach [34] is also very
promising for NNCS with discrete linear plants as it provides both soundness and
completeness properties in verification. ReachNN [19] is a recent approach that
can efficiently control the conservativeness in the reachability analysis of NNCS
with nonlinear plants and ReLU, Sigmoid and Tanh activation functions in the
controller. In other learning-enabled systems, falsification and testing-based ap-
proaches [12,13,41] have shown a significant promise in enhancing the safety of
systems where perception components and neural network controllers interact
with the physical world. Finally, there is significant related work in the domain
of safe reinforcement learning [2,15,42,53] and combining guarantees from NNV
with those provided in these methods would be interesting to explore.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented NNV, a toolbox for the verification of DNNs and learning-
enabled CPS. Our tool provides a collection of reachability algorithms that can
be used to verify the safety (and robustness) of real-world DNNs as well as
learning-enabled CPS, such as the ACC system. Our method is comparable to
existing methods such as Reluplex and Marabou when dealing with the open-
loop verification problem. For closed-loop systems, NNV can compute the exact
and over-approximate reachable sets of a NNCS with linear plant models. For a
NNCS with a nonlinear plant, NNV can obtain an over-approximate reachable
set and use it to verify the safety, but can also automatically falsify the system to
construct/find counterexamples (using exact analysis) or randomized simulations
(in over-approximate analysis).
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A Appendix: Additional Evaluation Details
Figures 5 and 6 show detailed comparisons between NNV’s approximate and ex-
act star methods relative to the zonotope, abstract domain, Reluplex, Marabou,
and Marabou divide-and-conquer (DnC) methods, summarized earlier in Table 2.
Fig. 5: Detailed verification results for φ3 of ACAS Xu networks.
Fig. 6: Detailed verification results for φ4 of ACAS Xu networks.
